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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Livingston J. Papse Sr. agreed to plead guilty to one felony
count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs and/or any other
intoxicating substance.

In exchange, the State agreed to concur with the sentencing

recommendation in the Presentence Report (“PSI”). That report recommended that the district
court retain jurisdiction. At the sentencing hearing, the State made that recommendation but also
made statements that were fundamentally at odds with the recommendation. Thereafter, the
district court imposed a sentence of ten years, with six years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Papse asserts
the State breached the plea agreement. Additionally, he asserts the district court abused its
discretion when it imposed an excessive sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In June of 2017, a citizen called Bingham County dispatch and stated that she observed a
Chevrolet Blazer cross the center line, cross the fog line, and almost hit a guard rail while driving
on Highway 91. (PSI, p.3.)1 The citizen said the vehicle had stopped at a store, and Mr. Papse
emerged as the driver. (PSI, p.3.) An officer responded and saw Mr. Papse leaving the store.
(PSI, p.3.) Mr. Papse admitted to drinking beer and later failed field sobriety tests but refused to
submit to a breath test and was transported to the hospital for a blood draw. (PSI, p.3.)
Subsequently, the State charged Mr. Papse with one felony count of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substance and
one related misdemeanor count. (R., pp.52-53.) In an Information-Part II, the State alleged that

1

All citations to the PSI refer to the 48-page electronic document, which, in addition to the PSI,
also includes other relevant attachments.
1

the driving under the influence charge was charged as a felony because Mr. Papse had a prior
conviction for driving under the influence. (R., pp.54-55.) And in an Information-Part III, the
State alleged that Mr. Papse was subject to an enhanced penalty as a persistent violator.
(R., pp.56-57.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Papse agreed to plead guilty to one felony count of
driving under the influence. (R., p.75; 7/18/17 Tr., p.8, L.15 – p.9, L.5.) In exchange, the State
agreed to dismiss the other charges and concur with the PSI’s sentencing recommendation.
(R., p.75; 7/18/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.20-25.) Subsequently, Mr. Papse pleaded guilty. (7/18/17 Tr., p.9,
Ls.6-24.)
The PSI recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction. (PSI, p.13.) Specifically,
the presentence investigator wrote, “Serving seven years in prison didn’t seem to help
[Mr. Papse], but he is a risk to the community without treatment and programming. Therefore, I
respectfully recommend that Livingston Papse Sr. be sentenced to a period of retained
jurisdiction.” (PSI, p.13.) Additionally, she stated, “While on a rider program, Mr. Papse can
participate in substance abuse treatment and classes designed to address criminal thinking.”
(PSI, p.13.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Papse’s counsel initially requested that the district court
place Mr. Papse on probation. (10/23/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-8.) In support of this, he reviewed the
fact that the district court had granted a continuance on the prior sentencing date to give
Mr. Papse a chance to see if he could get into inpatient treatment at Four Directions. (10/23/17
Tr., p.7, Ls.20-24.) Counsel explained that Mr. Papse had only one previous opportunity to
engage in treatment “about 17 years ago,” but he was following through on his new opportunity;
he had been evaluated by Four Directions, and he had begun outpatient treatment because the
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inpatient treatment program was not “up and running” as of that date. (10/23/17 Tr., p.7, L.24 –
p.8, L.14.) He also said that Mr. Papse was doing well on pretrial release and engaging in
treatment. (10/23/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-25.) He pointed out Mr. Papse knew that this was serious,
and he did not want to go back to prison but rather wanted to “get a handle on” his drinking, and
he had been succeeding with that through his ongoing treatment, so he was hoping to continue
with that treatment. (10/23/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-5.) Counsel also made an alternative request that
the district court retain jurisdiction, so that Mr. Papse “could get treatment . . . and then be able
to do probation when he’s out.” (10/23/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.10-16.)
The district court asked, “[A]s far as the treatment is concerned, the impression I get, in
going through this, is he’s basically opted to top his time out in all of the other cases, basically,
in effect, rejecting any rehabilitative programs in the past. So what’s different now?” (10/23/17
Tr., p.9, Ls.20-25.) Mr. Papse’s counsel responded, “I think being out for a short while now and
just his age2 and where he’s quite a bit older now, more mature, I think he’s just sick of it there.
He just doesn’t want to go back, and he’s willing to do whatever it takes not to go back.”
(10/23/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.1-5.)
The district court then asked for the State’s recommendation, and the prosecutor stated,
“At this time, the State’s recommendation, pursuant to the plea agreement in this matter, is to
concur with the presentence investigation and their recommendation. Clearly, the presentence
investigator recommends retained jurisdiction, which, quite frankly, is somewhat of a gift to
Mr. Papse, based on his history.” (10/23/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.9-16.) The prosecutor went on to say
that it agreed with the court that, “based upon his decision making within prison, that’s probably
why, that he’s topped his times out.” (10/23/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.20-22.) The prosecutor also

2

Mr. Papse was 69 years old when he was sentenced. (PSI, p.1.)
3

reviewed Mr. Papse’s prior record and pointed out that this was Mr. Papse’s seventh felony; the
district court said it counted eight and then reviewed those with the prosecutor. (10/23/17
Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.19.)

The prosecutor added, “In addition to that, a smattering of

misdemeanors that go with it.” (10/23/17 Tr., p.11, Ls.20-21.) He also stated, “And, you know,
as the Court is aware, when we’re dealing with cases like this of driving under the influence with
an individual and a defendant that continually and repetitively does this, it becomes a protection
of society issue. At what point does this individual place society at such risk that the only choice
is incarceration?” (10/23/17 Tr., p.11, L.22 – p.12, L.4.) Finally, the prosecutor said, “At this
point, the State’s recommendation will be a seven-year fixed, three-year indeterminate sentence,
with the Court retaining jurisdiction, and give the defendant an opportunity to prove he can do
treatment, even though he’s elected not to in the past.” (10/23/17 Tr., p.12, Ls.6-11.)
The district court subsequently imposed a sentence of ten years, with six years fixed.
(10/23/17 Tr., p.16, Ls.19-24; R., pp.97-99.) Mr. Papse then filed a notice of appeal timely from
the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.105-06.)

4

ISSUES
I.

Did the State breach the plea agreement when it made statements that were
fundamentally at odds with the recommendation it had agreed to make?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of ten years, with
six years fixed, following Mr. Papse’s guilty plea to one count of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating
substance?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Breached The Plea Agreement When It Made Statements That Were Fundamentally At
Odds With The Recommendation It Had Agreed To Make

A.

Introduction
When the State agrees to recommend a particular sentence as part of a plea agreement,

the prosecutor cannot make statements that are fundamentally at odds with that recommendation.
That is precisely what occurred here.

The State agreed to concur with the sentencing

recommendation in the PSI. The PSI recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction, and
while the prosecutor ultimately made that recommendation, he also made multiple statements
that were clearly contrary to that recommendation. This was a breach of the plea agreement that
deprived Mr. Papse of the benefit of his plea bargain.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether the State breached the plea agreement is reviewed by this Court de novo based

on contract law standards. State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 255 (2012). Mr. Papse did not object
to the prosecutor’s statements in the district court, but his claim that the State breached the plea
agreement is reviewable under the fundamental error doctrine. Id. at 255-56. In order to show
fundamental error,
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it
must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010).
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C.

The State Breached The Plea Agreement When It Made Additional Statements That
Undermined The Recommendation It Was Obliged To Make
Instead of simply concurring with the PSI’s recommendation, which was the State’s

obligation under the plea agreement, the prosecutor in this case made additional statements that
conveyed his reservations about the recommendation and suggested that a higher sentence would
be more appropriate. Thus, the prosecutor breached the plea agreement. “[P]lea bargains are
essentially contracts. When the consideration for a contract fails-that is, when one of the
exchanged promises is not kept-we do not say that the voluntary bilateral consent to the contract
never existed, so that it is automatically and utterly void; we say that the contract was broken.”
Gomez, 153 Idaho at 256 (quoting Puckett v. U.S., 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009)). “Because a claim
that the State breached a plea agreement affects whether the agreement was knowingly or
voluntarily entered, it goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant’s rights.” Id.
Indeed, as the Court of Appeals has previously explained, “[i]t is well established that
‘when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that
it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’”
State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 301 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 262 (1971)). “This principle is derived from the Due Process Clause and the fundamental
rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and intelligent.” Id. (citing Mabry v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1984); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 913 (Ct. App.
1985)).
When the State makes statements that are at odds with the recommendation it was
obligated to make, or effectively disavow that recommendation, those statements breach the plea
agreement because they “amount to a violation of the agreement.” State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho
608, 617 (1995). These breaches have always been recognized by Idaho’s appellate courts. In
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Lankford, for example, the State promised to recommend a lenient sentence. Id. at 616-17.
However, at sentencing, the prosecutor presented additional aggravating evidence, which the
Idaho Supreme Court noted, “clearly called for a greater sentence.” Id. at 617. As such, on
appeal, the Court explained, “Allowing the state to make the arguments and introduce the
evidence in aggravation to the extent that was done was reversible error, because it was so
fundamentally at odds with the position the State was obligated to recommend that it amounted
to a violation of the agreement.” Id. (emphasis added.) Therefore, even though the prosecutor
did not make statements that may have expressly disavowed the recommendation he was obliged
to make, the Court nonetheless held that the State breached the plea agreement and thus vacated
the sentences and remanded the case for resentencing. Id.
Similarly, in Jones, the prosecutor agreed to recommend retained jurisdiction in exchange
for the defendant’s guilty plea. 139 Idaho at 300. But while the prosecutor acknowledged that
she was bound by that recommendation, she also argued that the presentence investigator advised
against supervised probation, in part, out of concern for the safety of the victims and the
defendant’s poor prospects for rehabilitation. Id. at 300-01. She also said that she did not have
all of the aggravating information at the time she entered the plea agreement and, thus, left the
sentence up to the court’s discretion. Id. at 301.
The Court of Appeals noted that defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s
statements, but the court wrote, “Nevertheless, because a breach of a plea agreement is
fundamental error, a claim of such a breach may be considered for the first time on appeal if the
record provided is sufficient for that purpose.”

Id. (emphasis added).

After a thorough

examination of the relevant precedent, the court stated that while prosecutors do not need to
recommend sentences “enthusiastically,” they “may not circumvent a plea agreement . . . through
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words or actions that convey a reservation about a promised recommendation, nor may a
prosecutor impliedly disavow the recommendation as something which the prosecutor no longer
supports.” Id. at 302 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals went on to reference Lankford as well as additional authorities and
ultimately stated, “The principles expressed in the foregoing cases lead inescapably to the
conclusion that the prosecutor in the present case violated the plea agreement.” Id. at 303. It
held that the additional statements made by the prosecutor were “fundamentally at odds” with the
recommendation the State had promised to make. Id. And it wrote, “Although the prosecutor
uttered the recommendation required by the plea agreement, her other statements effectively
disavowed the recommendation of retained jurisdiction and advocated a harsher sentence.
Consequently, Jones did not receive the benefit of his plea bargain.” Id. (emphasis added). As
such, the court vacated Mr. Jones’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing before a
different judge. Id.
Likewise, in State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 774 (Ct. App. 2004), the prosecutor agreed to
recommend specific sentences but later argued that those sentences were the “very minimum”
the court should impose and stated that she was showing “great restraint” by only recommending
those sentences. As in Jones, the court noted that defense counsel did not object but that it could
consider the issue under fundamental error. Id. at 774-75. And it went on to hold that the
prosecutor’s arguments breached the plea agreement:
By presenting the recommended sentences as the minimum to be imposed and
indicating that this minimum recommendation was made with “great restraint,”
the prosecutor failed to endorse the recommended terms as the ones the district
court should accept. Instead, the prosecutor conveyed a reservation regarding the
advisability of imposing those sentences and implied that longer terms would be
more appropriate. This conduct was fundamentally at odds with what the state
agreed to do under the plea agreement.

9

Id. at 776 (emphasis in original). Thus, breaches of plea agreements resulting from prosecutors’
statements that conveyed reservations or impliedly disavowed the recommendations they were
required to make have historically been held by Idaho courts to constitute fundamental error,
which entitled a defendant to a new sentencing hearing. Since the Idaho Supreme Court’s
decision in Perry, however, the Idaho Court of Appeals has indicated that only express or
explicit statements disavowing the agreed-upon recommendation can be clear from the record
and thus constitute fundamental error. That interpretation of Perry is incorrect. The rule that
prosecutorial statements cannot be fundamentally at odds with the plea agreement, or impliedly
disavow the agreement, is still intact.
In 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the fundamental error standard. Perry, 150
Idaho at 226. It held that, if an alleged error was not followed by an objection, a defendant
would need to show that “the alleged error:

(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s

unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” Id. at 228. It stated, “We find that this
analytical approach clarifies our standard of review while adhering to the historic principles
underlying Idaho’s harmless error and fundamental error doctrines.” Id. And notably, it stated
“this opinion announces no new rule of law, but is only a clarification of our existing standards.”
Id.
But the Court of Appeals has interpreted Perry to mean that only express statements
disavowing a promised recommendation will constitute fundamental error. For example, in
State v. Stocks, 153 Idaho 171, 174 (Ct. App. 2012), after referencing Perry, the court held that
there was no “clear violation” of Mr. Stocks’s due process right because, “the requirement that a
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violation be ‘clear’ all but definitively defeats a claim of an implied violation of the type that
Stocks advances here.” And more recently in State v. Merrill, ___ P.3d ___, 2018 WL 3679672,
*4 (Ct. App. Aug. 3 2018), rev. pending, the Court of Appeals held that Mr. Merrill had also
“failed to establish a clear violation of his due process rights.” Referencing Stocks, the Merrill
court wrote, “The requirement that a violation be clear all but definitively defeats a claim of an
implied violation of the type that Merrill advances here.” Id. The court went on to state,
“Merrill’s argument, like Stocks’ argument, rests upon an implied breach3 arising from remarks
Merrill contends were ‘fundamentally at odds’ with the prosecutor’s actual recommendation.
We decline to find a clear constitutional violation under these circumstances.”

Id. These

conclusions are not only unsupported by Perry but represent a troubling departure from the
proper standard as they indicate that the Court of Appeals, without an objection, will only
consider a claim that a prosecutor breached a plea agreement when the prosecutor expressly
disavows the recommendation he promised to make or makes a different recommendation than
the one he was obliged to make.
Lankford, Jones, and Wills, however, have not been overruled by Perry, as Stocks and
Merrill suggest. Perry does not support the conclusion that only explicit disavowals of the
agreed-upon recommendation will be clear from the record and thus constitute a breach. Indeed,
other than requiring appellate courts to consider whether additional information is necessary to
determine whether a failure to object was tactical, Perry’s second prong does not require courts

3

The term “implied breach” was not used in Lankford, Jones, or Wills. In fact, this appears to be
the first time the Court of Appeals has used the term in this context. However, breaches cannot
be implied. A prosecutor either breaches the plea agreement or not. He can do that, as Jones and
Wills made clear, by impliedly or effectively disavowing the recommendation he promised to
make, but whether such statements ultimately constitute a breach is a question of law. Gomez,
153 Idaho at 255.
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to do anything different than what they have always done when deciding whether a prosecutor
breached a plea agreement. In fact, prior to Perry, appellate courts considering this issue
consistently required that—if there was no objection to the prosecutor’s statements—the issue
could “be considered for the first time on appeal if the record provided is sufficient for that
purpose.” Jones, 139 Idaho at 301 (emphasis added); see also State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho 299,
300 (Ct. App. 2004). Thus, after Perry, the only thing that might “definitively defeat” a breach
of the plea agreement claim is when the record is not sufficient—for instance, if the terms of the
plea agreement are not contained in the record, or the record shows that defense counsel’s failure
to object may have been a tactical decision.
Nevertheless, the Merrill court stated, “We will not parse through individual remarks at
sentencing to determine whether any of the remarks impliedly breached the plea agreement when
the applicable standard requires Merrill to show a clear constitutional violation.” 2018 WL
3679672 at *4 (emphasis added). The statements made by the prosecutor in Merrill were clear
from the record; the court listed them in its opinion. Id. at *3. Therefore, as was the case in
Jones and Wills, the court did not need to “parse through” them. It simply needed to consider
whether they were fundamentally at odds with the prosecutor’s agreed-upon recommendation.
Such a review considers whether they “impliedly” or “effectively” disavowed an agreed-upon
recommendation and thus advocated for a harsher sentence. Jones, 139 Idaho at 302-03. The
second prong of Perry did not eliminate or preclude the need for such an analysis. In fact, after
Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the only thing to consider under the
second prong of the test for fundamental error is “whether additional evidence is required from
the record.” State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221 (2014) (emphasis in original). Therefore, if
there is no need for additional evidence to see what happened and that it was improper, the
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second prong is met unless the record shows that counsel’s failure to object may have been
tactical.
While the second prong of Perry does consider the potential impact a tactical decision by
trial counsel might have, that analysis is focused only on what the face of the record shows. See
Perry, 150 Idaho at 229-30. If the face of the record shows trial counsel is potentially employing
a tactical strategy, then the face of the record does not clearly show an error, but where there is
no such showing on the face of the record, the error remains clear based on the evidence showing
the improper act. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230. In Perry, the Court noted that the record showed
defense counsel objected to one instance of prosecutorial vouching, but not others. Id. As a
result, the Court explained the record was not clear as to whether there was error in light of the
possible defense strategy not to object to the other instances of vouching: “It appears to be a
reasonable possibility, under the facts of this case, that defense counsel’s failure to object to the
prosecutor’s improper conduct in both eliciting vouching testimony and later referencing that
testimony during closing was a strategic decision.” Id. As such, the fundamental error claim
failed on the second prong. Id.
Similarly, in the case Perry referenced as an example of how tactical decisions can affect
the analysis, Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 n.5, the Court of Appeals found no error in the district
court’s failure to sua sponte remove an allegedly biased juror from the panel. State v. Adams,
147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009). As the Court of Appeals explained, the record in that case
showed the juror’s bias was directed only at the judicial process (the potential holding of
hearings outside the jurors’ presence), not at the defendant himself.

Id. at 862.

More

importantly, the record showed that trial counsel did not ask any questions trying to see if the
juror’s bias extended to the defendant himself; rather, it showed defense counsel affirmatively
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rehabilitating that juror and securing an agreement that the juror would try not to hold that bias
against the defendant. Id. at 860-61. Because the record showed defense counsel employed a
potentially reasonable strategy—keeping the juror to prevent a potentially worse juror from
taking her place—the Court of Appeals held there was no clear error. Id. at 862.
And in State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 568 (2013), Mr. Parton asserted that, “considering
the clarity of the law on this subject [prosecutorial misconduct by commenting on the
defendant’s silence], along with the fact that there could have been no reasonable strategic basis
for defense counsel to not have objected, it is clear that the error was plain.” The Court noted
that the State “asserts that Defendant’s trial counsel may have declined to object because he did
not think the testimony was objectionable or he was sandbagging.” Id. (emphasis added). But
the Court rejected the State’s arguments for two reasons.

First, it explained that defense

counsel’s ignorance of the impropriety of the prosecutor’s conduct precluded the conclusion that
the decision was tactical. Id. Second, it stated, “[w]ith respect to the possibility of sandbagging,
the State does not offer any reason to suspect that might have occurred.” Id. Therefore, Parton
reaffirmed that, if the face of the record shows the misconduct and does not show trial counsel
actually employing a potential defense strategy in the face of that misconduct, the second prong
of Perry is satisfied. Id. The Court also made it clear that speculation that a potential strategy
might have existed is not enough for the Court to find that the defendant failed to satisfy the
second prong of Perry.4 Id.; see also State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 166-67 (Ct. App. 2011)
(“We are left with only the State’s speculation that Sutton made a tactical decision not to object.

4

Parton ultimately did not determine whether the record actually revealed whether defense
counsel was employing a strategy because the analysis on the third prong was dispositive as it
showed any error was not prejudicial. 154 Idaho at 568.
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This Court concludes that information outside the record is not necessary to determine that
Sutton's failure to object was not a strategic decision.”).
In Merrill, however, the Court of Appeals took exactly the opposite approach and
actually speculated itself that there may have been reasons defense counsel failed to object. 2018
WL 3679672, *4.

It stated, “Even if there was a clear violation of Merrill’s unwaived

constitutional right, Merrill has also failed to meet his burden under prong two of
the Perry analysis as it relates to whether defense counsel's failure to object was a tactical
decision.” Id. And it wrote, “There are reasons that the failure to object could have been
tactical.

For example, counsel may have perceived the prosecutor's comments as proper

argument against the defense’s probation recommendation.” Id. (emphasis added). It went on to
state, “Counsel may have also declined to object based on his familiarity with the district court’s
sentencing practices, including that the district court was not likely to retain jurisdiction under
the circumstances, which the district court had already signaled it was not inclined to do
given Merrill’s history and the nature of the offense.” Id. (emphasis added). Finally, it stated,
“The only way to resolve that question is through information that is not included in the record.”
Id. Perry, Parton, and indeed the Court of Appeals’ prior decision in Sutton make it clear this is
not the proper analysis of the second prong.
In Mr. Papse’s case, the prosecutor recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction
as he was obliged to do under the plea agreement, but his other statements were fundamentally at
odds with that recommendation. Mr. Papse’s counsel did not object, but his claim of a breach is
reviewable under fundamental error, and all three prongs of the Perry test are met here.
Mr. Papse did not waive his right to due process, and because “a claim that the State breached a
plea agreement affects whether the agreement was knowingly or voluntarily entered” and “‘goes
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to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights,’” the first prong is met. Gomez, 153 Idaho at
256.
The violation of Mr. Papse’s rights is also clear from the record without the need for any
additional information. First, the existence and the relevant terms of the plea agreement are clear
from the record. (R., p.75; 7/18/17 Tr., p.8, L.15 – p.9, L.5.) Second, the fact that Mr. Papse
fulfilled his side of the bargain by pleading guilty is clear from the record. (7/18/17 Tr., p.9,
Ls.6-24.) And third, the prosecutor’s breach is clear from record. Indeed, immediately after he
made the required recommendation, he conveyed a reservation about it by saying that the
recommendation from the presentence investigator was “quite frankly . . . somewhat of a gift to
Mr. Papse, based on his history.” (10/23/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.9-16 (emphasis added).)
He went on to say that he agreed with the court that, “based upon [Mr. Papse’s] decision
making within prison, that’s probably why, that he’s topped his times out.” (10/23/17 Tr., p.10,
Ls.20-22.) As was the case in Jones, the prosecutor also recounted Mr. Papse’s criminal history.
(10/23/17 Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.1.) He also said, “And, you know, as the Court is aware,
when we’re dealing with cases like this of driving under the influence with an individual and a
defendant that continually and repetitively does this, it becomes a protection of society issue. At
what point does this individual place society at such risk that the only choice is incarceration?”
(10/23/17 Tr., p.11, L.22 – p.12, L.4 (emphasis added).) Finally, he said, “At this point, the
State’s recommendation will be a seven-year fixed, three-year indeterminate sentence, with the
Court retaining jurisdiction, and give the defendant an opportunity to prove he can do treatment,
even though he’s elected not to in the past.” (10/23/17 Tr., p.12, Ls.6-11 (emphasis added).) So
once again, he ostensibly made the recommendation but then immediately impliedly disavowed
that recommendation.
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These additional statements were fundamentally at odds with the recommendation the
prosecutor had agreed to make, and the blatant nature of the statements show that this was not a
situation where the prosecutor was simply making his agreed-upon recommendation
unenthusiastically.

Rather, they cannot be construed as anything other than an attempt to

encourage the district court to impose a prison sentence instead of retaining jurisdiction. This
breached the plea agreement because the statements clearly conveyed the prosecutor’s
reservations about the recommendation he was bound to make and called for a greater sentence. 5
Therefore, it is clear that the prosecutor’s comments—while “bookended” by the
recommendations he was obliged to make—were an attempt to circumvent the plea agreement
and encourage the district court to impose a sentence other than what the presentence
investigator recommended.
It is also clear that defense counsel’s failure to object in this case was not attributable to
some tactical strategy; there is nothing in the record indicating counsel may have failed to object
to the prosecutor’s improper comments for tactical reasons. Indeed, there is no reasonable
strategic basis why Mr. Papse’s counsel would not object to these statements, and there is no
feasible reason that would justify not objecting and possibly subjecting Mr. Papse to a harsher
sentence. Thus, the second prong of Perry is met.
The third prong of Perry is also met because there is “a reasonable possibility” that the
State’s breach of the plea agreement affected the outcome of the sentencing, and thus

5

There is no indication that the prosecutor made these statements in response to Mr. Papse’s
request for probation, as was the case in Stocks, 153 Idaho at 173-75. Indeed, he never
mentioned Mr. Papse’s request for probation during his sentencing recommendation. He was
also not arguing against the imposition of a lesser sentence as was the case in State v.
Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 164-68 (Ct. App. 2009). Rather, unlike the situation in
Halbesleben, his statements alluded to a more severe recommendation than that contained in the
PSI and expressed his opinion that Mr. Papse’s crime merited a greater punishment.
17

Mr. Papse’s substantial rights were affected. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Indeed, if the
prosecutor had actually focused on the reasoning the presentence investigator relied on when
recommending retained jurisdiction instead of calling that reasoning, and the resulting
recommendation, into question, the district court may have retained jurisdiction. In other words,
there was a reasonable possibility that the district court would have been swayed if the
prosecutor had endorsed the recommendation for retained jurisdiction instead of undermining it.
The presentence investigator realized that incarcerating Mr. Papse in the past was not
effective, and that he had been treated only once for his problems with alcohol abuse. (PSI,
p.13.)

Thus, the investigator wrote, “Serving seven years in prison didn’t seem to help

[Mr. Papse], but he is a risk to the community without treatment and programming. Therefore, I
respectfully recommend that Livingston Papse Sr. be sentenced to a period of retained
jurisdiction. While on a rider program, Mr. Papse can participate in substance abuse treatment
and classes designed to address criminal thinking.”

(PSI, p.13 (emphasis added).)

The

presentence investigator realized that punishing Mr. Papse with long prison sentences had not
worked in the past and had not led to his rehabilitation. She also understood that society could
be protected if Mr. Papse participated in a rider program because he would be incarcerated while
getting treatment, which would finally address his alcoholism.

(PSI, p.13.)

This was a

reasonable analysis of how best to accomplish the goals of sentencing given Mr. Papse’s
background. Thus, there was a reasonable possibility of a different sentencing outcome if the
prosecutor had not made comments that were fundamentally at odds with the recommendation it
was obliged to make.
Because the prosecutor breach the plea agreement, Mr. Papse’s sentence should be
vacated and his case remanded to the district court, where he is entitled to specific performance
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of the plea agreement at a new sentencing hearing before a different judge. McAmis v. State, 155
Idaho 796, 798 (Ct. App. 2013); Jones, 139 Idaho at 303.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Ten Years, With Six
Years Fixed, Following Mr. Papse’s Guilty Plea To One Count Of Operating A Motor Vehicle
While Under The Influence Of Alcohol, Drugs And/Or Any Other Intoxicating Substance
Based on the facts of this case, Mr. Papse’s sentence of ten years, with six years fixed, is
excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. When there is a claim
that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, this Court will conduct “an independent
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8 (2016). In
such a review, the Court “considers the entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Id. Appellate courts conduct a multi-tiered inquiry when an exercise of discretion is
reviewed on appeal. “The sequence of the inquiry is: (1) whether the lower court rightly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho
598, 600 (1989).
The third factor is the most important for sentencing purposes, and the one that is absent
in this case. “When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental
requirement is reasonableness.’” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)). Unless it appears that the length of the sentence is “necessary to accomplish
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution,” the sentence is unreasonable. Id. When a sentence is
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excessive “considering any view of the facts,” because it is not necessary to achieve these goals,
it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are several mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Papse’s sentence is excessive
under any view of the facts. First, Mr. Papse was 69 years old when he was sentenced in this
case. (PSI, p.1.) As such, his sentence may amount to a life sentence. This is a recognized
mitigating circumstance. See Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding
aggregate sentence for nine related counts of grand theft to be excessive, in part, because “to
incarcerate Cook for, at a minimum, the full determinate twenty-nine years would be nearly the
equivalent of imposing a life sentence given the relatively advanced age Cook will have reached
in a prison setting by the time he is even eligible for parole”).
Additionally, Mr. Papse has apparently struggled with alcohol abuse for most of his adult
life. He said that he first drank alcohol when he was only 15, and at the time of this offense, he
was drinking “about two six packs every day” when he was not working. (PSI, p.10.) A
defendant’s substance abuse problems should also be considered as mitigating information.
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (reducing defendant’s sentence, in part, because “the trial
court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in
causing defendant to commit the crime [the defendant had been drinking at the time of the
offense] and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem”).
Also, Mr. Papse is not well-educated—he completed seventh grade only—and the
assessor who completed his GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary noted that he is
showing signs of cognitive impairment. (PSI, pp.9, 15.) In light of these issues, and the fact
that, as the PSI writer noted, long periods of incarceration have not helped Mr. Papse to address
his alcohol problem in the past, rehabilitation and effective treatment should have been the

20

district court’s main focus here. As the PSI writer stated, “Serving seven years in prison didn’t
seem to help him, but he is a risk to the community without treatment and programming.
Therefore, I respectfully recommend that [Mr. Papse] be sentenced to a period of retained
jurisdiction. While on a rider program, Mr. Papse can participate in substance abuse treatment
and classes designed to address criminal thinking.” (PSI, p.13.)
The recommendation for a rider was also supported by the fact that Mr. Papse was
successfully engaging in treatment prior to sentencing. As his counsel pointed out, Mr. Papse
had begun outpatient treatment through the Four Directions Treatment Center.

(10/23/17

Tr., p.7, L.21 – p.8, L.6.) He was attending Relapse Prevention and a 12 Step program prior to
sentencing, and he was meeting with an alcohol and drug counselor on a weekly basis for
individual treatment. (Defendant’s Exhibit A.) His counsel also pointed out that Mr. Papse had
been doing well on pretrial release, and he was staying sober and coming to court when he was
supposed to. (10/23/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.17-21.) He went on to say that Mr. Papse was taking this
seriously because he did not want to go back to prison and wanted to “get a handle” on his
alcohol abuse. (10/23/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-4.) And Mr. Papse himself said he felt he would benefit
from treatment as he had only one period of residential treatment approximately seventeen years
prior to his sentencing in this case. (PSI, p.10.) After that treatment, Mr. Papse said he was able
to stay sober for a year and one-half. (PSI, p.10.) Thus, he is amenable to treatment, and
treatment was somewhat effective for him in the past, so he would benefit from long-term
treatment. A defendant’s amenability to treatment is a recognized mitigating factor. See State v.
Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008).
Given all the mitigating factors in this case, Mr. Papse’s sentence was excessive because
it was not necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. Indeed, society would be protected if
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the district court retained jurisdiction because if Mr. Papse did not demonstrate that he was
succeeding with his treatment, the district court could relinquish its jurisdiction and send
Mr. Papse to prison. A rider with a significant underlying sentence would also serve as a strong
deterrent and ensure that there was appropriate retribution in this case. But most importantly, it
would give Mr. Papse a chance at meaningful rehabilitation, which would in turn give him an
opportunity to live out the rest of his life free from the specter of alcohol abuse. Thus, given the
facts of this case, Mr. Papse’s extended sentence was not necessary and was therefore
unreasonable. The district court did not adequately consider the mitigating information in this
case and thus failed to reach its decision through an exercise of reason. Therefore, it abused its
discretion when it imposed such a long sentence without first giving Mr. Papse an opportunity to
prove himself in a rider program.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Papse respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand his case
for resentencing before a different judge. Alternatively, Mr. Papse requests that this Court
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 21st day of September, 2018.

/s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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